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Muslims in Sri Lanka’s 
Ethnic Conflict
Muslims in Sri Lanka, categorized as a 
separate ethnic group, are Tamil speak-
ing and have sometimes been claimed 
by Tamil nationalists to be part of the 
larger Tamil nation. Though publicly 
rejected by Muslim leaders at various 
historical moments, this inclusion in 
the Tamil nation has been attractive 
to some Muslims living in the Tamil 
majority areas of the North and East. 
Muslim youth of the Eastern Province, 
for instance, participated with Tamil 
groups in the early militancy against 
the state, and Eastern Muslim politi-
cians often joined Tamil political parties to contest elections. This re-
lationship, always difficult, has now deteriorated—with assistance 
from the state—into a complete polarization between the two com-
munities. Muslims have been targeted, displaced, and dispossessed by 
armed actors of both the state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), and recently by the LTTE breakaway faction—the Tamil Makkal 
Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP).
While there has been some improvement in recognizing Muslim 
grievances since the beginning of the peace process in 2002, this has 
not resulted in any substantial policy changes to 
address such grievances. The peace process has 
failed to take Muslims’ issues sufficiently into ac-
count despite Muslim political actors being part 
of the government. In fact, the preamble to the 
ceasefire agreement, which set off the 2002–2005 
peace process, referred to Muslims as a “group 
not directly party to the conflict.” While civil so-
ciety and political actors’ agitations reversed this 
understanding to a certain extent, the current 
regime, with its pursuit of a military solution and 
a clear majoritarian platform has little interest in 
Muslim concerns. Today it seems that the meagre 
gains of those times may already have been lost. 
This article—through brief descriptions of the 
expulsion of 1990, the Post-Tsunami Operational 
Management Structure (P-TOMS) of 2005, and 
the siege of Mutur in 2006—will trace the history 
of Muslim inclusion within the conflict and the 
peace process. 
The expulsion of 1990
In October 1990, all over the Northern Province, close to 75,000 
Muslims were compelled to vacate their homes at gun point, hand 
over their belongings, and leave.2 In Jaffna, home to a fairly affluent 
trader community, the LTTE called all the men to a meeting during 
which cadres raided their homes. At the meeting, the men were in-
structed to leave their valuables behind and vacate their homes with-
in two hours. Similar events happened with varying levels of brutality 
in the five other districts of the Northern Province. The expelled are 
still haunted by the manner in which they were compelled to leave, of 
women giving birth on the crowded boats, and of children drowning 
after falling overboard. Some say that the LTTE sold the abandoned 
goods at auctions; some say they were given away. 
These people lost their homes, possessions, livelihoods, communi-
ties, and personal histories in one day. They left behind their belong-
ings, their community, and their sense of citizenship in Sri Lanka. A 
generation of children, unable to complete their education, lost their 
futures. Today they live in over-crowded settlements in the impov-
erished district of Puttalam. Their lives 
parallel the hundreds of thousands of 
Tamils and Sinhalese in the country 
who were also displaced and saw their 
lives destroyed. The Muslim experi-
ence, however, has its own distinctive 
features, which are reflective of their 
“no-”place status in the Sri Lankan 
polity. The story of their forced exodus 
is not widely known. Few commenta-
tors give the expulsion the attention 
that it merits as a highly significant 
historical event that changed the lives 
of the Muslims of the North and East. 
The government has neither established a commission of inquiry nor 
arranged special administrative provisions for the displaced. A newly 
established government secretariat for northern Muslims located in 
Puttalam may handle certain administrative matters for the commu-
nity, but there has been no attempt to find a long-term solution. Six-
teen years after the expulsion they are still living as displaced persons 
in a district other than their own, amongst those that consider them 
aliens. Many of the expelled Muslims fear registering themselves as 
residents of the Puttalam district since they might, thereby, forfeit 
their right to reclaim their property and resettle in the North.3 The 
host community in Puttalam resents the incursion of the refugees 
whom they say threaten the meagre resources available in the area. 
The Tamil-speaking Muslims have problems accessing health care 
and other state amenities due to difference in language. They can-
not go back to their places of origin without the consent of the LTTE, 
the very organization that expelled them as they fall under their de 
facto administrative jurisdiction. The other particularity of the suffer-
ing of Muslims in Sri Lanka is that their plight does not have a place 
in any larger nationalist narrative—either a narrative of a liberation 
struggle (Tamil nationalism), or in a fight to safeguard the mother-
land (Sinhala Nationalism). They remain caught in between, and the 
Muslim political leadership has not been successful in articulating its 
position in a manner independent of the two nationalisms dominant 
in the country. This lack of a larger narrative means that many com-
mentators have treated the story of the Muslims as little more than a 
footnote to the conflict.
The LTTE and Tamil nationalists have different levels of justifica-
tion for the expulsion—some speak of security issues, others speak 
of Muslims as traitors to the Tamil-speaking nation. In the first flush of 
the 2002–2005 peace process, former LTTE political strategist Anton 
Balasingham stated that the expulsion was a “strategic blunder” on 
their part and that Muslims were free to return.4 Tamilcelvam, LTTE 
political wing leader, offered an official apology to representatives of 
the Muslim community visiting him, and assured Muslims assistance 
to resettle when the North was under their administration.5 Return-
ing Muslims however, reported different levels of harassment by local 
carders. Today, close to 75,000 people from the North live in displace-
ment in the North Western district of Puttalam with no status, limited 
state assistance, and barely any voting rights. Given the severe pov-
erty of the area in which they are forced to live, the Muslims have be-
come dependent on politicians, government functionaries, and NGOs 
for all elementary needs.
To make matters worse, the fact that most Muslim political parties 
have their primary vote base in the East means that they are not es-
pecially sensitive to the particularities of the northern experience. 
The political process is forcing “solidarity” between the Muslims of 
the North and the East without taking into account the differences 
between the regions. For instance, the polarization between Eastern 
Regardless of when, precisely, Sri Lanka’s 
protracted conflict began, this conflict is 
most often cast as one between the majority 
Sinhalese and the minority Tamils. In this 
bipolar understanding of the conflict, the 
Muslim community seems to have no place, 
even though Muslims constitute close to 40 
percent of the population in the conflict-
affected Eastern Province and have been 
expelled from the Northern Province. This 
article describes the plight of these Muslims 
and analyzes the discursive and political 
powers by which Muslims are marginalized.1
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Tamils and Muslims is intense, while northern Muslims continue to 
speak of cordial relations with their Tamil neighbours and consider 
the LTTE rather than the Tamils as a people to be culpable for the 
expulsion. 
The P-TOMS
The tsunami of 26 December 2004 devastated Sri Lanka’s Eastern 
Province. The Muslims in the area lived in densely crowded communi-
ties that have spread closer and closer to the ocean given the restricted 
availability of land. The tsunami took a devastating toll on these com-
munities: official figures state that 18,000 Muslims, or one percent of 
the total Muslim population of the Island, perished. Given that a large 
portion of the affected area was controlled by the LTTE, the government 
was urged by both local activists and the international community to 
work with the LTTE in formulating a mechanism to channel tsunami 
assistance. After many closed-door discussions, the Post Tsunami Op-
erational Management Structure (P-TOMS) to address reconstruction in 
the North and East was unveiled. To the Muslims it was an affront. The 
arrangement to address the devastation of the tsunami, from which 
the Muslims suffered extensively, had been produced as an agreement 
between the government and the LTTE without the participation or 
consultation of Muslims. While a representative of the Muslim parties 
was to be part of the essentially symbolic apex body, the rest of the 
tiers of the arrangement were weighted heavily in favour of the LTTE, 
which was also given veto power over the decision making process. 
After the 2002 ceasefire, the LTTE cadres had ready access to Muslim 
areas of the Eastern Province and many incidents of intimidation and 
extortion were reported. Muslims feared that the P-TOMS would insti-
tutionalize this harassment. Another reason that Muslims loathed the 
P-TOMS was that, given its links to the peace process, many saw it as 
a precedent for the future exclusion of Muslim parties from the proc-
ess. Muslim parties felt that this was yet another attempt by the LTTE 
to undermine their political leadership. By contrast, members of the 
government felt that the Muslims were not adequately acknowledging 
the important breakthrough of including Muslims in the apex body. 
However, Muslims were not happy with the paternalism of a process 
that “included” them without consultation. Muslim agitation against 
the P-TOMS compelled the government to address Muslim concerns 
even after the fact. However, the P-TOMS became irrelevant when the 
Supreme Court found sections of the agreement unconstitutional and 
a presidential election augured the end of President Kumaratunge’s re-
gime. Moreover, with the current regime’s pursuit of a military solution, 
the little that was gained by Muslims now seems lost. 
Mutur in August 2006
The presidential elections of November 2005 brought to power the 
UPFA candidate Mahinda Rajapakse on an anti-minority, anti-peace 
process, and pro-unitary state platform that was formed through the 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party’s (SLFP) part-
nership with the two Sinhala national-
ist parties. Rajapakse won the election 
mainly since the LTTE prevented the 
Tamil population of the North and East 
from voting. Through this symbolic as-
sertion of their separation, the LTTE ef-
fectively prevented the election of the 
pro-peace, federalist United National 
Party candidate. From the date of the 
election victory, the peace process 
speedily deteriorated, with claymore 
mine attacks and aerial bombard-
ments, as well as suicide bombings in 
Colombo becoming the norm. One of 
the most prominent incidents of the 
military confrontation was the LTTE’s 
attempt to take over the mostly Mus-
lim Eastern Province town of Mutur 
that borders one side of the Trincoma-
lee natural harbour. On 1 August 2006 
the town came under attack as the two 
parties fought for control, with both 
sides firing artillery towards the built-
up areas of the town while the civil-
ian population was still there. Forty-nine people seeking refuge in the 
school buildings were killed. In the nearby mostly Tamil town of Thopur 
a shell landed on St. Anthony MV School, killing twelve people. When 
Mutur town was largely under LTTE control the Muslim community ap-
pealed through intermediaries for the Government to end the shelling. 
The military, however, continued its firing into the town. 
After three days of shelling, Mutur Muslims decided to leave the 
town and were given assurances of safety by the LTTE. On their way 
to Kantale, they were diverted off the main road (A15) by LTTE cad-
res, and taken to Kiranthimunai, which is under LTTE control. Here the 
LTTE picked out individuals alleged to be members of a Muslim armed 
group working with the government. These men were tied up and the 
rest were told to move on. The fate of 66 individuals who went missing 
at Kiranthimunai is still unknown. 
Conclusion
It has long been in the interest of the chief protagonists of the con-
flict—the Sri Lankan state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam—to 
propagate an understanding of the conflict in reductive two party 
terms. While Muslim community agitations in the aftermath of the CFA 
of 2002 have compelled both parties to take notice of Muslim interests, 
their consideration of Muslim issues is little more than perfunctory and 
often for propaganda purposes only. The LTTE’s empty invitation to 
Muslims to return to the North, and the paternalism of Muslim “inclu-
sion” in the P-TOMS are cases in point. The mortar 
attacks on Mutur while Muslim civilians were still 
in the town is an indication of the current govern-
ment’s disregard for Muslim civilian lives.
The Rajapakse regime overturned many of the 
successes of the 2002–2005 peace process. It is 
unclear what direction the Sri Lankan conflict 
will take at this point. The regime is pursuing a 
military solution to the conflict, and its complete 
disregard for civilian casualties from the minority 
communities is troubling and does not bode well 
for the future of Muslims. In pursuing its current 
policies, the regime is also distancing itself from 
the international community, and possible pres-
surizing tactics that civil society groups use via 
the international community may not, therefore, 
be effective anymore. Muslim civil society today 
is compelled to reorganize and strategize how it 
might best address community concerns in the 
new dispensation. 
Notes
1. I thank Shreen Saroor and Mirak Raheem for 
sharing insights and information. This article 
is one part of our joint ongoing work on the 
Muslim community’s concerns in Sri Lanka.
2. For a detailed description of the expulsion, 
see S. H. Hasbullah, Muslim Refugees: The 
Forgotten People in Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict 
(Nuraicholai: Research and Action Forum for 
Social Development, 2001). 
3. Catherine Brun, “Local Citizens or Internally 
Displaced Persons: Dilemmas of Long 
Term Displacement in Sri Lanka,” Journal of 
Refugee Studies 16, no. 4 (2003): 376.
4. Press conference in Kilinochchi, April 2002.
5. Conversation with Moulawi Sufiyan, member 
of the Muslim community displaced from 
Jaffna, and currently politician, and human 
rights activist. 
Temporary 
shelter at a 
school in MuturPH
O
T
O
 B
Y
 F
A
R
Z
A
N
A
 H
A
N
IF
F
A
, 
2
0
0
6
Farzana Haniffa is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Sociology, University of Colombo. 
Email: haniffa_fuad@sltnet.lk
